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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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
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No. 0273/72  
14 November 1972

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS



25X1

LEBANON: Strikers and police clash. (Page 3)

SAUDI ARABIA - AFRICA: King Faysal begins African tour. (Page 4)

ECUADOR-US: Tuna boats seized (Page 5)

UK: Trade balance improving markedly (Page 5)

MEXICO: Policy on air hijacking (Page 6)

THE GERMANIES: Implications of the Inter-German Treaty. (Page 7)

~~SECRET~~

25X1

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023200030001-0

SECRET

LEBANON: A clash between striking workers and police has provided Prime Minister Salam's opponents with an opportunity to attack the government.

Two persons were killed and several more wounded in an incident between police and striking workers at a Beirut chocolate factory over the weekend. This incident triggered a call by union leaders for a general strike today in Beirut. A general strike yesterday in Tripoli was reported to be 50-percent effective. The government, which already has its hands full controlling the fedayeen, has placed the army in charge of security and moved additional troops and armor into the capital city.

Salam's opponents on both the right and left are supporting the unions in the hope of embarrassing the government and possibly forcing the prime minister to resign. In recent months, public criticism of the government has been increasing as a result of its inability to cope with such major domestic issues as education policy, unemployment, and the development of backward regions. Salam may survive the present crisis, but the number of Lebanese disenchanted with his government clearly is growing.

25X1

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SECRET

SAUDI ARABIA - AFRICA: King Faysal will begin a two-week, five-nation tour of Africa today in an effort to strengthen Saudi Arabia's ties with the Muslim populations of the continent.

Faysal will stop first for a three-day visit in Uganda, which recently received a \$15-million, interest-free loan from the Saudis for use in development projects. Although Muslims make up only a small proportion of Uganda's population, President Idi Amin is among them, and Faysal has looked favorably on Amin's expressions of Arab-African solidarity, as well as his expulsion of the Israelis last March.

Other stops on Faysal's itinerary, each of approximately three days' duration, include Chad, Senegal, Mauritania, and Niger, which have large Muslim populations. The Saudis have recently opened or intend to open embassies in each of these countries and in Uganda. Faysal sees Saudi Arabia as a bridge between the Arab nations and Muslim Africans, and he hopes to promote African support for the Palestinian and other Arab causes. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

14 Nov 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

4

SECRET

SECRET

NOTES

ECUADOR-US: Several US tuna boats have been seized since Sunday for fishing within Ecuador's claimed 200-mile territorial sea. Some of the vessels have valid Ecuadorean fishing licenses and have been released, but (unlicensed vessels probably will be detained until fines are paid.) This action follows by less than a week a stiffening of Ecuador's tuna policy. The Ministry of Natural Resources has informed the US Government that, in the interest of conservation, the total annual tuna catch is to be limited to 80,000 tons, with a 60,000-ton limit for foreign boats. Last year, US vessels alone caught more than twice that tonnage. Fees for fishing licenses are also to be raised by 60 percent. Although it appears that the migratory tuna are less plentiful off Ecuador this season, the measures announced in Quito also represent an effort by Ecuador to strengthen its position in the continuing discussions with the US toward reaching a fishing accord. [REDACTED]

25X1

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UK: Britain's trade balance continues to improve markedly since the dock strike settlement in August. Foreign trade figures for October show a deficit of only \$110 million, compared with \$315 million in September and a record \$448 million in August. If Prime Minister Heath's wage-price freeze can check the inroads of inflation on the competitive advantage resulting from the downward float of the pound, the trade account should continue to improve. [REDACTED]

25X1

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MEXICO: The recent hijacking of a Mexican airliner to Cuba could prompt the Echeverria government to adopt a more receptive attitude toward international legal efforts to combat air piracy. Mexico strongly upholds the right of individual states to grant political asylum and objects to any international conventions or treaties that do not explicitly state this right. In this case, however, the government considers the hijackers and prisoners freed as ransom to be common criminals and is seeking to extradite them from Cuba. Mexican officials have indirectly criticized the actions of the Castro regime, saying that countries which protect hijackers are responsible for plane hijackings. Should Cuba refuse extradition and grant the hijackers political asylum, as seems likely, the incident may help encourage Mexico to moderate its position on the right of asylum in cases where hijacking is involved.

25X1

14 Nov 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

6

SECRET



THE GERMANIES: Implications of the Inter-German Treaty

The inter-German treaty initialed in Bonn on 8 November artfully papers over diametrically opposed public positions on the basic nature of relations between the two states. The treaty establishes a basis on which East and West Germany can take up formal relations with each other for the first time. Beyond this, the pact complements the West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland of 1970 in setting the stage for more normal relations, and thus it is a principal element in Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. The treaty therefore is part and parcel of his innovative effort over the past decade to contribute toward easing East-West tensions and lifting the mortgages of World War II--with the stated goal of promoting conditions in Central Europe conducive to eventual German reunification. For Pankow, the treaty opens the way to the long-elusive Western stamp of legitimacy, leading to general international recognition, membership in the UN and other international organizations, and participation in international accords and conventions. For Moscow, the treaty, along with the earlier Soviet and Polish treaties, provides a kind of confirmation of postwar Central European "political realities."

The treaty will quickly open the way to completing Ostpolitik's structural framework. West Germany and Czechoslovakia will soon renew their efforts to find a compromise of the issue of the Munich Agreement of 1938, the major roadblock to conclusion of a treaty of reconciliation. Bonn will then move to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. The ensuing fleshing out of Ostpolitik will see a gradual expansion of West German economic and political activity throughout Eastern Europe.

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Matters of Interpretation

The inter-German treaty undermines some formerly fundamental pretensions of both states--East Germany as the nucleus of a Communist Germany, and West Germany as the only legitimate German government--but leaves others untouched. The statement that the two continue to disagree on issues of principle, "including the national question," allows Bonn to maintain that there is still a common German nationhood. It also permits Pankow to assert that common nationhood disappeared with the creation of two German states. Pankow refused to include in the treaty itself sovereignty-limiting references to the absence of a World War II peace treaty and to continuing Four-Power rights and responsibilities in Germany and Berlin. But Pankow did agree to exchange letters acknowledging that the treaty does not affect Allied rights and responsibilities, and Bonn can point to the new Four-Power declaration on these rights as safeguarding its position. The agreement to exchange "permanent representatives" is a compromise designed to meet the East German desire to establish diplomatic relations and Bonn's insistence on not recognizing East Germany as a foreign country.

Brandt never presumed that the treaty would bring down the Berlin Wall, but he does hope to inaugurate an era of easing tensions and abating hostilities in inter-German relations, and to improve the conditions of people in both countries. Thus, the ancillary agreements that have been or soon may be reached with East Germany are almost as important for him as the treaty itself. As arranged during the negotiations, the East Germans will open a number of new border crossing points, permit children to join parents who fled to West Germany, and allow West Germans residing near the frontier to visit adjacent areas in East Germany. For the first time, arrangements will be made to exchange and accredit each other's press correspondents.

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14 Nov 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

8

SECRET

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### Political Campaign Role

The timing of the treaty was intended to give Brandt's hard-pressed lameduck Social Democratic - Free Democratic coalition an opportunity in the closing days of the parliamentary election campaign to divert attention from issues such as inflation on which it is vulnerable. His target is the unusually large 15 percent of the voters who, according to the polls, were still on the fence as of late October. Christian Democratic leader Barzel at first reacted to the treaty with cautious skepticism, but then unleashed heavy criticism. He claims to be ready, if he becomes chancellor, to seek renegotiation on any points he deems deficient.

He is unlikely to follow through on this reservation. Regardless of any Christian Democratic doubts, so many larger developments are now in train that an effort to delay or deny ratification of the treaty would bring down opprobrium on Bonn from all sides. Although an inter-German treaty was not a prerequisite for holding a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or beginning talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, the fact that a draft--however imperfect--exists is in itself an important atmospheric component. Bonn's failure to ratify would put it out of step with its allies and create an inauspicious atmosphere.

### Foreign Recognition of Pankow

Several countries, including some NATO allies, are anxious to recognize the German Democratic Republic for what they see as political as well as economic advantage. Among the neutrals, Finland and Sweden may move as soon as late November or early December, regardless of the complexion and wishes of the next government in Bonn. The West German Government is seeking NATO reaffirmation that recognition should await treaty ratification, but Denmark and Iceland profess to be under domestic pressure

14 Nov 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

9

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and may disregard any NATO strictures. The French, furthermore, have said [ ] that for domestic reasons Paris would like to be the first among NATO countries to recognize Pankow when Bonn gives the signal, and the British have suggested that the US, British, and French missions in Berlin begin consultations to coordinate their approaches to Pankow.

25X1

The international recognition and UN membership that the inter-German treaty will bring in its train should give an unprecedented boost, at least in the short term, to the self-confidence of the East German regime. At home, however, it will have to continue to guard against any erosion of its control stemming from increased contacts with West Germany. Interest in travel to the West has revived since the implementation of the Berlin agreements last spring, and there has been an increase in the flow of East German refugees to West Germany. Internationally, Pankow can be expected to follow the Soviet lead closely, for East Germany remains the linchpin of Moscow's European security system.

It is conceivable, nevertheless, that the CSCE and MBFR exercises could evolve in such a way as to weaken the East German - Soviet inter-dependency and in time promote evolution of assertiveness in Pankow. There is ample testimony that the working out of Ostpolitik abraded the Pankow-Moscow relationship. Some East Germans believe that the numerous concessions they have made toward inter-German detente have earned them the right to assert their interests. Soviet diplomats involved in the Four-Power negotiations on the Berlin Agreement in 1971 and the Declaration on Rights and Responsibilities this year have testified to a certain East German sensitivity and stubbornness on issues affecting Pankow's conception of its sovereignty.

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The Brandt government's conduct of Ostpolitik has served notice that the Federal Republic has reached maturity in international affairs. The essence of the new spirit in Bonn is that West German governments henceforth will be more active in pursuit of what they perceive to be their national self-interest. Although West Germany's primary orientation will remain toward the West, leaders in Bonn will increasingly deal with the Soviets, Chinese, and East Europeans, who will have a greater presence in West Germany than heretofore. A Barzel-led Christian Democratic government, however, probably would not be able to develop Ostpolitik further as successfully as Brandt, and would be more willing to try to exploit differences within the Communist world.

In the final analysis, the inter-German treaty, like Ostpolitik as a whole, will be no more durable than East-West detente in general. The East German gains--international recognition and UN membership--cannot be withdrawn, but West Germany's gains from the treaty itself are largely in the realm of the intangible. Bonn's concrete gains lie outside the treaty in the areas of practical improvements granted by Pankow. These presumably are still subject to restriction when and if it should suit Soviet and East German interest.

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